

WASHINGTON.

"Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable."

SATURDAY, JUNE 12, 1847.

WHAT WE ARE FIGHTING FOR—NEW GROUNDS OF THE WAR.

There is no consequence of the pending War, either actual or probable—not the effusion of blood nor the waste of treasure—which is more to be dreaded by us as a Nation than our losing in its progress the sympathy and esteem of the civilized and Christian world. Until the unhappy series of measures began which led to the existing attempt to trample a neighboring Republic into the dust, we stood, the gaze and the delight of those who love human happiness, the contrast of tyrannies, the fairest civil spectacle that the world had seen—that of a great country, not more just, wise, vigorous, and yet moderate in all its foreign policy, than liberal, equal, and beneficent in its domestic. All eyes were turned upon us—those of the good to admire, and of despots themselves to regard with respect the example of a rising splendor so blameless. Hither the oppressed, even in distant hemispheres, sent forth their thoughts and their hopes, whenever they dreamed that, with courage, virtue, and prudence, all may be free. The philanthropist beheld in us the arrival of a new era in human affairs, an era of humanity and peace; and the philosophic student of social institutions hailed in the workings of our public order the realization of almost Utopian theories. To all this bright reputation, this admiration, and this expectation abroad, a severe blow has been dealt; and even at home, where patriotism forbids that men should so easily despair, the warm confidence of a few years since in the solidity of our institutions is fearfully shaken. Never, in short, has the Government of any country undergone a change of position more strange, or more alarming: never was any country, to such a point, more the favorite and the hope of mankind; nor ever before did pernicious rulers contrive, in so brief a space, so deeply to mortgage the national character as ours have done.

When this Administration came into existence, by the fiat of Gen. JACKSON,* registered in the Baltimore Convention, we were at peace with the foreign world, and in the enjoyment of perfect tranquillity at home. The Annexation question had been settled by Congress; in a form not warranted by the Constitution, it is true, but yet acquiesced in rather than resort to a violent remedy; and care had been taken by Congress, in the act of annexation, for the pacific adjustment of any question concerning it which might arise between the United States and Mexico. Within our own borders every branch of industry was prosperous beyond example: the sails of our ships whitened every ocean in the pursuit of a profitable commerce, which, besides rich freights to the merchants in exchange for our surplus products, poured into the national coffers a copious and abundant stream of revenue. The President had nothing to do but to take things as he found them, and leave them so, to have secured to his country, during the whole of his official term, a tranquil prosperity, and to himself the enviable renown of a wise and paternal Magistrate. But tranquillity was not the element for him. In proportion as Nature had apparently fitted him for it, he disdained it. Arrived at the Presidency, WAR, CONQUEST, and DOMINION seem to have filled his thoughts and haunted his repose. His waking thought was "the whole of Oregon or none," and his earliest dream was of trumpet-calls to the bold spirits of the West, of a march to the Hall of the Montezumas, of war and bloodshed, and finally of a second "Conquest of Mexico." Such were the indications, not to be mistaken, of the Presidential intents and aspirations, as reflected by the mirror which it was his first act to set up here as the organ of his Administration. The practical results of these early promptings of a misguided ambition soon disclosed themselves in substantial acts. The patriotism and wisdom of the Senate, and the good sense of the British Government, saved us from the threatened collision in the distant wild of Oregon. But no wisdom or patriotism of the Senate, or of Congress, could save us from the War with Mexico. Though foreseen and foretold, the People were deaf and would not hear—blind and would not see—whilst the President was stealthily laying plans, and actually taking measures which must necessarily lead to the concussion that followed. Time and again we directed the public attention to these things; but our remonstrances and deprecations were unheeded. Four months before the first meeting of Congress under this Administration, we called the attention of the Public to the probability that the Executive would yield to the solicitations of Texas (just "annexed") so far as to occupy territory to the line of the Rio Grande—which occupation, we then said, was "nothing short of an invasion of Mexico," and would be an act of the President "making war, in the full sense of the word, on his own authority;" and, a couple of months afterwards, to the departure of Commodore STROCKTON, in a steam-frigate from Norfolk, with his mission to California announced from his quarter-deck; and yet later, to the intention of the President to make war upon Mexico; an intention avowed at the moment only by the reception of news from Mexico of her willingness to

* It has been publicly avowed, and not contradicted, (as far as we are informed,) that even the terms of President POLK's Inaugural Address were prescribed to him at the Hermitage, before his departure for Washington, by Gen. JACKSON, whose ruling passion thus displayed itself in the latest moments of his life.

The circumstance to which allusion is here made is the disclosure, in a letter from Washington to the Journal of Commerce, dated October 30, 1845, of the fact that the President's forthcoming Message to Congress would contain recommendations of a hostile nation towards Mexico; the precise character of which the writer vaguely described as "the way the FRENCH took"—that is, bombarding the maritime cities of Mexico. This, the reader will remember, was full six months before the "shedding of blood" on the banks of the Rio Grande. To vindicate our own consistency, and to show that our opinion of the President's bellicose and conquering designs upon Mexico was the same before as since he put them in execution, we transcribe from the National Intelligencer of November 6, 1845, the following remarks, elicited by the information of the intended recommendation by the President to Congress of "the way the French took" with Mexico, which was to have been contained in the forthcoming Message:

"We can imagine nothing more revolting to common sense, as well as to any idea of justice and public faith, than what is now intimated to be the 'probable' purpose of the Executive.

"Is there to be no mercy, no shame? Can this country

receive a Commissioner to settle the boundary dispute—a purpose, on her part, defeated, as our readers know, by our sending a Minister to treat of things in general, instead of a special Minister to treat on the particular topic of discord. Our warning voice was raised in vain. The overpowering interest of the Oregon question, then yet unsettled, withdrew the public attention from what the President was doing until the thunders of this War of his making broke upon our ears.

In the conduct of this War, from the beginning of it to the present time, we see only the Absolute Will of the Executive, carried out by his own acts, and to this day only so far sanctioned by Congress as has been necessary to save the National Arms from disgrace.

But, if capable of learning any thing, the Administration should surely have come to understand, by this time, that the ambitious calculation on which the war was at least hazarded, if not absolutely courted, by ordering our troops (unmolested, and even unthreatened, at Corpus Christi) to advance into the Mexican territory, has proved as sad a blunder as ever was made by arithmeticians counting the blood of thousands for nothing, in a problem from which they thought to work out power, reputation, and popularity for themselves. They should surely have felt, by this time, that their own dividend of the public favor and reputation expected from this war has been a good deal worse than nothing; that its successes have rebounded to others, its reverses alone to them.

Thus far, there has been a continual shifting of all the alleged causes and aims of the War. And while, in general, the setting up different, even if inconsistent, pleas for any action, is proof enough that all of them must be weak and insincere, here the varying allegations have been such as, in nearly every instance, to annihilate each other. So little was the art with which was managed all that preparation in which we found its only defence!

In our paper of the 20th of March last, we traced, to the number of eight successive ones, the grounds and objects of the war, which had then, at different times and in several quarters, been held out by the Executive and its organs. All these we then substantiated, by the citation of their official sources; for, upon such grave matters, we choose never to argue without proofs which are incontestable. Omitting here, as no longer necessary—first, because they can be referred to in the paper already mentioned; and, secondly, because reproducing them entire would weary our readers and us—the documents out of which we then established these conflicting declarations of the Administration and its agents, we shall merely recapitulate their effect and tenor, in order that the public may once more compare them, not only with each other, but with certain additional and incompatible avowments of cause and purpose, which it has pleased the Government subsequently to make, and more especially in the Proclamation lately addressed to the Mexican people, from the city of Jalapa, by Gen. SCOTT, in the name and of course by the orders of his Commander-in-Chief, the President.

First of all, as we then showed, the Executive alleged that this war was merely defensive; was forced upon us, by Mexico's crossing the Rio Bravo into our territory and then slaying our people; was, in a word, according to the Executive Message of 11th May, 1846, a war of which the cause was "the shedding of American blood upon American soil," by Mexico; while the object of the war was to repel invasion.

Next, omitting all the previous allegation, when talking to the Mexicans themselves, the President, by a Proclamation furnished to Gen. TAYLOR on the 4th June, 1846, stated, as the justifying cause of the war, the refusal of Mexico to pay the indemnities due for spoliation of our citizens. The object of the war was, in the same document, declared to be, not to repel invasion, but to procure indemnity for the old injuries, and to re-establish a free government in Mexico, instead of that of PAREDES.

Thirdly, in his Annual Message of December last, the President—forgetting that the final rupture between his ambassador, MR. SLIDELL, and the Mexican Government under Gen. HERRERA did not happen until about two months after the fact of which he made it the cause—stated to Congress that he directed Gen. TAYLOR to advance to the Rio Bravo (which all must now admit to have been the first and the fatal overt act of war) in consequence of the refusal of the Mexican Government to receive Mr. Slidell as our Minister.

Fourthly, in the Proclamation already cited, sent from this city, General TAYLOR was made to say that, besides the obtaining of indemnities, the objects of the war were, To overturn the then existing Government of Mexico; to re-establish the freedom of the Press; and to set up a Republican Government in Mexico; which designed "republican Government" is plainly avowed in the Presi-

dent's last Annual Message to have been meant to be that of SANTA ANNA!

Fifthly, in the Report of the Committee of Foreign Relations, (H. of R. February 24th last,) its chairman, Mr. C. J. INGERSOLL, speaking, from that confidential position, of the War and the Message, said that "the war had created a new and admirable System of Finance, worth more than all its (the war's) charges." The system here meant is incontestably the FREE TRADE system of Finance; which consists (as every body knows) in the Low Import Duties, with Treasury Loans and Notes to fill the void. Now, this system is that with which the present Administration began its existence. If, then, the war was necessary to create that system, the war was designed before the system; or, at least, as its creative cause, must have existed before the passage of the Free Trade Tariff, in August, 1845; and accordingly we know that Gen. TAYLOR's first orders to pass the Nueces are older than the date of the New Tariff Act. If we consider that, without the war, the Administration would have had no need for Loans and Scrip, and that the Free Trade party were the original Annexation party, we shall better understand Mr. INGERSOLL's assertion of the relation between the war and the McKay Tariff.

Sixthly, the object of continuing the war (as the President assured the country, in his last Annual Message) is to secure a peace. If he had said that the object of peace is to secure a war, he would have uttered a truth as profound, a justification as equitable. As the most appropriate means of securing a peace, breaking it is certainly an odd one; especially as, besides, Mr. INGERSOLL says war is the appropriate means of erecting valuable systems of Finance; and the President himself had already pronounced it the means of repelling invasion, of procuring indemnities, of getting Ministers received, of overthrowing tyrannies, of substituting for them republics, of vindicating the freedom of the Press, of (as he will presently assure us) paying you for the expenses it puts you to; in short, there is nothing like it: it is the most economical thing in the world, but requires large indemnities for its expense; it is very repulsive and very attractive—that, to drive out invaders—this, to get in a minister; it is very subversive of tyrants, very constructive of free governments; it is excellent for liberating the Press in Mexico, and for enslaving it in the United States; but, above all things, there is nothing like war for its peacefulness!

Seventhly, in the same Message, the Presidency promises thus: "The war will be vigorously prosecuted there (in Mexico) with a view to obtain an honorable peace, and thereby secure ample indemnity for the expenses of the war." Thus "an honorable peace" becomes the object for which a war is prosecuted, which both Mr. BENTON and Mr. CALHOUN (who never agreed in any thing else) agree—supporters of the President as they are, or have been—ought to have been avoided, and might easily; but the peace thus obtained is clearly to be "honorable" only as "securing an ample indemnity for the expenses of the war." So that, with a delicious confusion of ideas, we have a war set on foot to repel an invasion, which we either made or marched in search of; and we are keeping up the war in order to extort an ample moneyed indemnity of its expenses (for the President will not avow any acquisition of territory as his object) from a nation so poor, so mortgaged and hypothecated in all its revenues, that the very army in which was placed all its hopes starved at San Luis Potosi, and the great fortress of San Juan de Ulua fell with but six days provision in it, because Mexico could not, for her life, raise the half of a million of dollars! From a people thus moneyless, credulous, beggarly, we were to get back, as the terms of an honorable peace, the cost of all the war on our side, besides enabling them to pay their own! It is indemnities no longer for the ancient spoliation of our citizens that we seek; them we abandon; "an honorable peace" can be made without them. So, too, of ridding Mexico of a Tyranny and setting up again our friend, the President's protégé, that lover of liberty, SANTA ANNA: the President has got him back, to the head of an army, into the Presidency; so that these are no longer conditions of the "honorable peace," or objects of the "peaceful war." Nor is the Liberty of the Press; nor is the reception of Mr. SLIDELL: nor is Free Trade at home; nor is an invaluable System of Finance—for we have got it, and a debt of probably at least a hundred millions of dollars as a part of it. In short, the only object of the war is Indemnity for its expenses; and, as the Administration's Congressional organ, the Chairman of the House Committee of Foreign Relations, has avowed to the world that the system of Finance created by the war is worth to us more than its cost, on an equitable settlement Mexico owes us less than nothing!

Eighthly, in our former survey of the objects of the war, we showed that the same Congressional organ of the Administration, its Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations, had, in his Report on the President's Message, avowed for the Executive that the purpose of the war is one which this Government has pursued ever since Mexico became independent (1821)—that is, the acquisition of California. For that document says: "Complaints of the resort to territorial conquest from Mexico are disarmed of reproach by the facts that Mexico, by war, constrains the United States to take by conquest what, ever since Mexican independence, every American Administration has been striving to get by purchase; and that the Executive orders and military and naval execution of them, FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CONQUEST, have conformed not merely to long-established policy of our own Government, but to principles of self-preservation, indispensable to all provident government."

We showed, then, from this particularly confidential source, (which immediately represents in Congress the views of the President and Secretary of State as to questions of our Foreign Policy,) that the Administration has, through its legislative organ, declared that we are fighting to get what we have long wanted, but its owner would not sell—that is, California: that its possession is to us a matter of self-preservation; and that, therefore, every prudent Government in our situation would take it by force, since we have been unable to get it otherwise. Now, as Mr. INGERSOLL cannot intend to charge Mr. POLK with neglecting for us what mere self-preservation renders indispensable, he must be held, in effect, to declare that this Administration did not criminally wait for Mexico to constrain it to save us from destruction, by laying the strong hand on California, but prudently,

"providently," patriotically, took the initiative, and picked a quarrel (the Executive is at a loss to say about what) with Mexico.

Thus far we have recited afresh, and in a more summary shape, the causes and objects of war which had, before the 20th March, been avowed by or for the President. Since that time he has been good enough to supply us, through further declarations, with additional variations of pretext. Some of these we shall now proceed to chronicle—including with them certain others which, though elder, we had overlooked, and continuing our original numerical arrangement.

Ninthly. On the 6th of July last, (less than two months after the battles of Resaca de la Palma and Palo Alto, known here on the 23d of May only, and before, therefore, he could have received any orders from here, or any thing in addition to his original instructions, except the direct news, from the Rio Bravo, of hostilities begun there,) Commodore SLOAT, as a Commander-in-Chief of the United States Naval forces in the Pacific Ocean, issued a proclamation "to the Inhabitants of California," declaring that he was about to take possession of that entire department; that "henceforth it will be a portion of the United States;" that "its peaceable inhabitants will enjoy the same rights and privileges as the citizens of any portion of that Union;" that they shall "choose their own magistrates and other officers from among themselves;" that "the same protection will be extended to them as to any other State of the Union;" that "they will enjoy a PERMANENT GOVERNMENT;" that they shall "worship the CREATOR in a WAY MOST CONGENIAL TO EACH ONE'S SENSE OF DUTY;" that, "of course, the revenue laws will be the same in California as in all other parts of the United States;" that, under our Government, "a great increase of the value of real estate and the products of California may be reasonably expected;" that "the country cannot but improve more rapidly than any other on the continent of America;" that those, natives or foreigners, who do not like to live under our Government and with the privileges of its citizenship, shall be allowed to sell out their property and quit, or to remain, if they will "observe strict neutrality;" finally, he invites all "judges, alcaldes, and other civil officers to retain their offices and execute their functions as heretofore," "until the government of the territory can be more definitely arranged."

Now, it is certain that the forces under Com. SLOAT's command were stationed upon the coast of California to await the hostilities which our Cabinet were working up on the other edge of Mexico, by marching armies, blockading fleets, the Slidell quarrel, &c. The Commodore was expected to be able, at the first sound of war, to take possession of the Territory. He had, therefore, his instructions as to all the civil consequences of taking and keeping possession; that is, how and upon what principles the country was to be governed and its people treated. To suppose the contrary is impossible; and it is equally impossible to suppose that, having the necessary instructions, he would deviate from them, before he got ashore or met any difficulty. This Proclamation is clearly, therefore, to be taken as embodying just what his instructions directed him to do (and neither more nor less) as soon as he learned with certainty that war had broken out. Further: these instructions, being in advance of the pretended cause immediate of the war—the "invasion of our soil" and shedding on it "the blood of our citizens"—could not know what Mexican injury we should have to avenge, nor, of course, what degree or sort of redress we might justly take. Yet here we see this President of ours ordering a whole country to be seized and permanently kept at the firing of the first gun! At home he has, in his own person, loudly denied all purposes of conquest; and this, long after he had commanded it in California. Here, he says we fight "to conquer a peace" only; there, he has usurped a whole broadside of the continent, and constituted its people, without their consent or ours, equal and perpetual members of this Union; for it is indissoluble, and, once in it, who are to put them out? In a word, having first made them citizens and their country a State forever, (for that word only, not "territory," figures in the context of the proclamation,) he next makes himself their supreme legislator, the source of all their laws and rights, the fountain of all magisterial and other municipal or legislative authority, and even the head of their religion, of which, at his fiat, all the conditions are altered! This last point offers a remarkable commentary on the sincerity of the Union's late disavowal, for the President and Cabinet, of any participation in the project which lately appeared in that organ, for pulling down the Catholic priesthood in Mexico, as enemies to the liberty, property, and enlightenment of that country. The very same measure had already, in a milder form only, been applied to California, and is now legally in force there, if the Executive is at all bound by his own engagements to any body but the Baltimore Convention.

Tenthly. In the proclamation issued by Gen. KEARNY (22d August, 1846) on reaching the capital of New Mexico, the cause of the war is largely stated (as in Commodore SLOAT's) to be "the act of Mexico" in crossing the Rio Grande and attacking General Taylor; and the object of the war is not even indicated in either proclamation, except that both declare the possession taken to be permanent, and therefore put two great regions out of all further question of right, of negotiation, of fair and "honorable peace." This silence as to justice of claims, and this decisive action of mere and bare conquest, once more substantiate that as the real object of the war—an object which could as little, from the necessity of the case, be disavowed in the countries meant to be dismembered from Mexico, as it could with advantage be avowed anywhere else. And this is, we venture to say, the key to all those contradictions, and that amazing governmental pervariation, which we are now attempting to trace through its many shiftings, turnings, and windings.

But the Santa Fe proclamation has other features peculiar to it. To stretch thither the claim (founded on a mere impotent act of Texas legislation, and nothing else) to all the soil east of the Rio Grande would have been idle: the tale of the old Santa Fe Expedition made it impossible to pretend that the Texas claim was not altogether fictitious in that quarter. Putting aside, therefore, all pretence of title up to the Bravo, this proclamation "announces our General's intention to hold the Department with

its original boundaries (on both sides of the Del Norte) as a part of the United States, and under the name of the Territory of New Mexico;" that he is instructed by his Government to respect the religious institutions of New Mexico, protect the property of the church, and "preserve their religious rights" in "the amplest manner;" that he is to respect the rights of private property: that he is to defend them from the hostile Indians; that they must aid him in enforcing the laws (of the United States:) that all who have left their homes through dread of our troops, or to fight us, must return to them forthwith: that, if they do not, "they will be considered as enemies and traitors, subjecting their persons to punishment and their property to confiscation;" that "it is the wish and intention of the United States to provide for Mexico" (all Mexico) "a FREE GOVERNMENT, with the least possible delay;" that "the people of New Mexico will then be called on to exercise the rights of freemen in electing their own Representatives;" that meantime the "existing laws will continue in force and the actual magistrates remain in office," provided they comport themselves as good citizens and "take an oath of allegiance to the United States;" that the General "releases all New Mexicans from their allegiance to Mexico;" that "he hereby claims them as citizens of the United States;" that "such as are found in arms or instigating others against the United States will be treated accordingly." [NOTE. "Accordingly" means hung, as has been since abundantly explained by practice.] Finally, the proclamation says that Gen. K. will, for the present, "be considered Governor of the Territory."

It is not a little curious, in comparing these two last proclamations, to observe one special difference: the nearer to the President's person, the more absolute the civil powers which he assumes; and the further from that presence, the stronger the religious authority he puts on. In California he lets men off from being hung for not coming back to their houses when they are bidden; in New Mexico he does not; in Santa Fe he "protects their church" and "their religious rights in the amplest manner;" in Monterey of the Pacific he abolishes the supremacy of the Mexican faith altogether. Yet, again, his royal will deals diversely in other particulars: California he at once constitutes a State; New Mexico but a Territory: in the former, every body (black, white, red, or mixed, and bond or free) is at once a full citizen of the United States; in the latter, the boon is only distant and prospective—when he shall have "provided for Mexico a free government, similar to those of the United States." In other respects, supreme power is exerted with an even hand: he appoints what shall be law and who its officers in both countries. For the present, continuing their old laws and officers, he lets Mexico legislate and appoint for a United States Territory; but presently he will be even with them, and do all the law-giving and distribute all "the spoils" himself.

It is true, the Government, through its organ here, has pretended to deny that it had given authority for these extraordinary proclamations. The disavowal is, however, contradicted by prior and by subsequent facts. We are, at this moment, engaged in showing that the affirmative declarations of this Administration are deceptions; and why should its negative ones be more candid? No: as we have already urged in regard to Commodore SLOAT, so of the case of Gen. KEARNY: both expeditions were very deliberately planned at the Navy and War Offices: were executed at leisure: were looked on as certain to secure to us two easy conquests, themselves (with the expected glory and popularity of their acquisition) no doubt at first the utmost foreign objects of the war. In both quarters, Mexico was known to have slender forces, the inhabitants believed to be ready to hail our sway, and that sway, therefore, to be certain of permanence. Is it, then, possible that a regular subjugation of two large countries—new to our language, our laws, and almost any other—should have been projected and executed without any instructions to their conquerors as to the civil order which was to be set up in them? Were the officers of our army and navy—unaccustomed to any but military rules—to be left to their own discretion, their own inexperience? Incapable as we hold this Administration, we consider such improvidence impossible. On these matters the commanders must have been furnished with instructions—probably, indeed certainly, even with proclamations ready printed, for they were issued instantly on the act of taking possession—a good deal sooner than they could have been printed in Monterey or Santa Fe, where there were then no printing presses. Well, as we have said, being furnished with instructions, no officer could have dared to set up a Government not in conformity to them. So much for facts preceding the proclamations; and now for facts subsequent to them. They have been disavowed: have the officers issuing them been punished or even censured for such flagrant usurpations? The very contrary: Gen. KEARNY has been promoted and sent on as Governor of California. He has, then, incurred no loss of confidence. But has the Government annulled the regulations, the laws, the authorities which it has disavowed? Nothing of the kind, in California; and, in New Mexico, some seven or eight months after the enactment of these strange laws, they have lately been enforced in their most dreadful and monstrous provisions. Under their claim of the self-bestowed allegiance of a people unable to repel their invader, many of the best and bravest of the New Mexicans have been put to the ignominious death of hanging, for only attempting what Emmet and Kosciuszko attempted—what Tell and Washington accomplished—the liberation of their country from a foreign yoke!

Eleventhly. The war (according to the late project of the Union for sequestrating the Church property in Mexico) has one of its main causes in the existence of the Catholic Religion in Mexico, and should therefore adopt as one of its objects the stripping that Church of its wealth and influence there, and the bringing about popular enlightenment by introducing there more elevating forms of faith.

The government organ, it is true, suggested this policy as one which the Government might consider of and presently adopt: but it was the policy only, not the facts, which it stated as not yet resolved. The facts it laid down as certain; and, they being certain, success demands the policy. How far the previous orders to Commodore SLOAT went towards the same object, we have already seen: so that, if the Union has, upon the exhibition of much public wrath at the scheme, been induced, in

the fervor of its zeal for the Administration, to claim this excellent idea as entirely the Editor's, and as opposed to the views of the President and Cabinet, one thing must yet be remarked: that the Union's idea at least wants the merit of originality—for they who drew up the Californian proclamation are the true parents of the conception. In short, this skirt-clearing for the Administration by its organ is a sort of effort not likely much to change any body's opinion of the real source of the plan.

Twelfthly. We come, as equally discordant or bad, to the causes and objects of the war, as set forth in the latest Government proclamation—that issued from Jalapa on the 11th of May by Major General SCOTT, which it was our main purpose to notice to-day, but in taking it up found the preceding train of thought forced upon our minds.

The Proclamation of Gen. SCOTT sets out with saying to the Mexicans that "truths which have been criminally concealed from them (by those at home) must be told them;" that "whatever the origin of the war, the United States were forced to undertake it" (a phrase more than half-admitted that we began it: but see further presently) "by causes unknown to the greater part of Mexico." ('These causes, so little known in Mexico, cannot, of course, be the fact that they had invaded a soil of which we were in possession: for how should people invade a foreign country without knowing it? Nor that they had refused to receive Mr. Slidell on his own terms; for that all Mexico must know. Nor to obtain indemnities for old injuries to our citizens; for of that, as a cause of war, all Mexico has heard. Nor to overthrow the Government of Paredes, nor to vindicate the freedom of the press; for Mexico is no doubt well acquainted with our Matamoros Proclamation of 4th June, prepared at our Department of War, and published to her by us in Spanish. Nor our Ingersollian necessity of creating a valuable financial system, nor our desire to "conquer a peace," nor our determination to make her pay for the war; for all this we have said long ago, and Mexico is fully persuaded of it all. Nor can these unknown causes be any thing else that this Government has published to the world in its own justification. Still less can they be any thing which has been in negotiation between the two countries, and by Mexico published to her people. We here can say, with little fear of contradiction, that if the Mexican rulers have only labored half as much to conceal the objects of this war as ours have done, their guilt is enormous. But, whether known or unknown, either in Mexico or here, this new proclamation is clearly about to reveal to both nations what ONLY THEIR GOVERNMENTS know or could know—the hitherto secret causes why they are fighting. Come, then! let us go on and learn.)

The Proclamation proceeds to say (taking care, like the Matamoros one, to say nothing about Mexico's having invaded the United States) that "we regard the war as a necessity;" that, indeed, "all wars were so regarded by the nations who are parties to them" (especially if properly kept in the dark by their Governments); that in Mexico, as with us, there is a war-party and a peace-party; this thinking the war wrong—that, right. "But that Governments have sacred duties to perform, from which they cannot depart; and that often these duties impose, for national reasons, a SILENCE AND A RESERVE sometimes displeasing" (as the avowed reasons of this Administration have been) "to the majority of those who, from views purely personal and individual, make opposition." (Our Government, that is to say, found itself forced to dissemble the motives of the war, and incur reproaches at home, lest, by speaking out too plainly, it should (as we shall presently see) bring other parties into it against us. "To these (views) a Government cannot pay any regard, expecting the nation to place in it the confidence merited by a magistracy of their own election." &c. And now comes, at last, the secret of the Government's silence, or rather its prevarications; for it has talked abundantly, taking care only to avoid the truth:)

"Reasons of high policy and of Continental American interest precipitated events, in spite of the circumsppection of the Cabinet of Washington, which, ardently desiring to terminate its differences with Mexico, spared no resource, compatible with honor and dignity, to arrive at so desirable an end; and when it was indulging the most flattering hopes of accomplishing its aim by frank explanations and reasonings, addressed to the judgment and prudence of the virtuous and patriotic Government of Gen. D. J. Herrera, the misfortune took place which dispelled this pleasant hope, and at the same time blocked up every avenue which could lead to an honorable settlement between the two nations. The new Government discarded the national interests, as well as those of Continental America, and elected in preference foreign influences the most opposed to those interests, and the most fatal to the future of Mexican Liberty and of the Republican System, which the United States hold it a duty to preserve and protect. Duty, honor, and dignity itself imposed upon us the necessity of not losing a season of which the monarchical party was taking violent advantage, for not a moment was to be lost; and we acted with the promptness and decision necessary in a case so urgent, to avoid thereby a complication of interests, which might render our relations more difficult and involved."

Now, mark what these new and vast revelations turn to, with the aid of a little running commentary! Reasons of high policy and of Continental American interest precipitated events. Mexico refused to adopt these "reasons;" the "policy and interest," therefore, which "precipitated events"—that is, the War—were OURS. OUR CONTINENTAL POLICY precipitated the war. But while our Cabinet was "ardently" laboring for peace and conciliation—by ordering an army to advance into Mexican territory—"a misfortune the least looked for" overtook the Herrera Administration. Yet that very misfortune had been all the while held up by our Government to Ambassador SLIDELL as certain to happen, if the Mexican Government yielded to his requisition to be received as full Minister. HERRERA told him (see the correspondence) that they had not agreed, nor did they dare to receive him, except as a Commissioner; that the very suspicion of such a thing had strengthened against him a party (that of PAREDES) then intriguing for his overthrow. Well, MR. SLIDELL, in spite of all these very reasonable representations, persisted; quarrelled upon the mere mode and title of his diplomacy, mere matters of form to every body but him, and came away rather than put up with the half-title of a mere Commissioner; or else came away because this Government sought a pretext, not a settlement. His conduct compelled the Mexican President to divulge the negotiation for his own justification; and the popular feeling running high against any such concessions to us as HERRERA was accused of being about to make, he was upset by PAREDES. This event, it is easy to see from the context, is that which (our Government now says) "blocked

the fervor of its zeal for the Administration, to claim this excellent idea as entirely the Editor's, and as opposed to the views of the President and Cabinet, one thing must yet be remarked: that the Union's idea at least wants the merit of originality—for they who drew up the Californian proclamation are the true parents of the conception. In short, this skirt-clearing for the Administration by its organ is a sort of effort not likely much to change any body's opinion of the real source of the plan.

Twelfthly. We come, as equally discordant or bad, to the causes and objects of the war, as set forth in the latest Government proclamation—that issued from Jalapa on the 11th of May by Major General SCOTT, which it was our main purpose to notice to-day, but in taking it up found the preceding train of thought forced upon our minds.

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